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Korea, China, and Western Barbarians:
Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea
TAKEMICHI HARA
Department of Japanese Studies, University of Hong Kong
The story of the ‘opening’ of Korea presents us with a peculiar prob-
lem of its own. For, when Westerners arrived on the shores of Korea
in the nineteenth century, they found a country that was shielded
in the shadow of China. Korea, so it seemed to Westerners, would
not open the country without Chinese approval, but China would not
interfere in Korea on Western countries’ behalf or, at times, even
on her own behalf. And both Korea and China professed that they
were acting according to the dictates of the traditional relationship
which had bound the two countries for many centuries in peace and
harmony. To Western observers this traditional Sino-Korean rela-
tionship seemed to offer nothing but a diplomatic cul-de-sac. Under
the circumstances, it is not surprising that Western diplomats con-
cluded that this relationship was merely ceremonial and largely dis-
missed it as having little political consequence.1
It was perhaps also unfortunate that this negative view of tradi-
tional Sino-Korean relations has affected our perception of Korea
much more seriously than of China. In examining Korea’s diplomacy,
we would inevitably compare it with that of China. In this compar-
ison, Korea, whose seclusion was more complete and lasted longer,
would invariably appear the more backward, ignorant, and bigoted.
I would like to thank the participants of the undergraduate seminar of the
Faculty of Oriental Studies, the University of Cambridge, and of the East Asian
School Seminar of the University of Sheffield for their critical comments. I am also
grateful to Professor Sir Harry Hinsley for his insightful comments.
1 The American minister in Seoul remarked on Korea’s professed inferiority and
various duties to China under the tributary relations: ‘While nothing could be
clearer than this concession, the Legation has never laid much stress upon it, being
disposed to believe that in all the essential points of government, in laws, customs,
and religion, Corea was as independent as Japan. All that remained was a senti-
mental, ceremonial suzerainty, never going beyond gifts and compliments, embass-
ies of courtesy now and then, with no practical interference by China in Corean
affairs’. John Russell Young to Freylinghuisen, March 21, 1883, quoted in M. Fred-
erick Nelson, Korea and the Older Orders in Eastern Asia (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1946), p. 167.
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This is nowhere more apparent than in the oft-quoted work by Mary
C. Wright. In her article entitled ‘The Adaptability of Ch‘ing Diplo-
macy: The Case of Korea’, Wright challenged the prevailing assump-
tion that Chinese foreign policy of the 1860s was ‘weak, inept, and
uninformed’, and argued that, when one considered ‘the striking
accomplishments of the Ch‘ing government in the 1860s’ and when
one had adequate ‘appreciation of either the character or the magni-
tude of the problems the Ch‘ing government faced’, the ultimate
failure of the Ch‘ing government’s Korea policy was ‘because the
task was impossible, not because Chinese diplomacy was rigid, in-
adaptable, uninformed, supine, or lacking in finesse’. She also wrote:
‘Chinese adaptability stands out in bold relief when Chinese policy
. . . is compared to Korea’s own absolutely rigid policy.’2 The end
result of Wright’s persuasive argument, so far as our approach to
Korean history is concerned, was to transfer the weight of all these
pejorative adjectives onto Yi Korea and thereby to make us less than
sensitive to the more complex realities of Korean diplomacy.
Wright’s influence is apparent, for example, in Key-Hiuk Kim’s book,
published more than two decades after her article. Having analyzed
the triangular relations among China, Korea and Japan most care-
fully, using primary sources of these three countries, he concludes:
‘in light of what we have seen, there is little need for further proof
of the rigidity of the Korean stand against the Western world during
the 1860s.’3
While diplomatic historians continued to assess Yi Korea’s foreign
policy by the application of rigidity–adaptability scale, a somewhat
different perspective on the subject has emerged from a work which
focused primarily on domestic politics and government of the late
Yi period. James B. Palais, in his Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea,
devoted a chapter to the fierce debate which took place in the Korean
court in the 1870s over the diplomatic overture for new relationship
from the new Meiji government in Japan. His findings indicate that,
in this debate, problems of foreign policy were linked to issues in
Yi Korea’s domestic politics. The refusal by the Taewo˘n‘gun and
conservative officials in the Yi court to have anything to do with the
Meiji Japan or, for that matter, Western powers was indeed founded
2 Journal of Asian Studies 17.3 (May 1958), pp. 363–81. The quotations are from
p. 363.
3 Key-Hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and
the Chinese Empire, 1860–1882 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of
California Press, 1980), p. 62.
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on their anti-foreign ideology. But Palais’ account shows the debate
also touched on the real issues of Korea’s national security.4
It appears that some efforts are now in order to examine Yi
Korea’s foreign policy from a broader perspective than is offered by
a rigidity–adaptability model. In this paper, I propose to review a
number of incidents involving Westerners in Korea from the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century to the 1860s. Some of these incidents
involved Christian movements, which the Korean government con-
sidered as heresy against the orthodox Confucian teaching. The
others involved foreign ships, British and French, which sailed into
Korean waters to demand trade relations. China figured prominently
in all these incidents, even when she took no active part. Christianity
came to Korea from China, and the priests, whether of Chinese or
French nationality, travelled to Korea from China. The foreign ships
which came to Korea also sailed from Macau in the early days and
from one of the treaty ports in China after the Opium War. In the
eyes of the Koreans, these foreign incidents were inseparable from
Korea’s relations with China. Korea’s response to the Western incur-
sions in the nineteenth century must therefore be judged in relation
to her traditional policy towards China.
Korea’s Traditional Relations with China and Japan
At the beginning of the nineteenth century Korea continued to enjoy
the stable relationships with China and Japan as she had done for
the past one hundred and sixty years. With China, she maintained a
cordial relationship which was based on the Chinese claim of suzer-
ainty over Korea. The government of Korea sent a regular mission
bearing tributes to the emperor of China at least once a year, usually
at the time of the winter solstice, and irregular missions on other
special occasions, as an expression of its submission to China. The
Chinese government reciprocated by sending on such special occa-
sions as the death of an important royal person or the investiture of
a new king an imperial mission to show its ‘benevolence and concern
for the small neighbour’ (tzu-hsiao).5 With Japan, Korea had main-
4 James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press, 1975), ch. 13, ‘The Debate over Accommodation with Japan’.
5 Hae-jong Chun, ‘Sino-Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch‘ing Period’, in John
K. Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 90–111; Kim, The Last
Phase, pp. 4–15.
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tained contact on two levels. Since the early seventeenth century,
she had sent occasional ‘communication envoys’ to Edo carrying con-
gratulatory messages usually on the accession of a new shogun. Their
functions were mostly ceremonial, and diplomatic matters of sub-
stance were seldom discussed between these envoys and the Japanese
host. Korea also maintained a much closer relationship with the
feudal fief in Tsushima, the islands that lay across the Korean Strait
between southwestern Japan and the Korean peninsula. Poor in nat-
ural resources, the islands depended much on Korean trade for their
livelihood. The daimyo of Tsushima had long entered into a quasi-
tributary relationship with the Korean king which gave him the
monopoly of Japanese trade with Korea, and also had served as a
diplomatic intermediary between the national governments in Edo
and Seoul thereby enabling them to negotiate without being overly
hampered by delicate questions of protocol.6
Yi Korea had suffered immensely at the hands of these two neigh-
bours, first by the Japanese who, under the hegemon Hideyoshi,
invaded Korea without the slightest provocation in the late sixteenth
century, and then by the Manchus in the early seventeenth as these
border tribes waged a war of conquest against the Ming dynasty.
Even after the Manchu conquest of China in 1644, the ruling house
of Yi Korea suffered much hardship at the hands of the Manchus
who suspected the Koreans of pro-Ming motives. The policies of sadae
(‘serving the great’—China) and kyorin (‘neighbourly relations’—
with Japan) had emerged from these traumatic experiences.7
The essence of these relationships was to bar all intercourse
between Korea, on the one hand, and China and Japan, on the other,
except for formalized ceremonial exchanges of envoys and limited
trade conducted under close official supervision. In both relation-
ships, even though one emphasized the inequality of status between
the two parties and the other the equality, the great ceremony with
which the tributary missions to China and the communication envoys
to Japan were dispatched signified the desire to keep these two
neighbours at a safe distance. The two policies also dovetailed to
complement one another: by submitting themselves to China’s suzer-
ain claim, the Koreans gained something like a defensive alliance
against Japan; the kyorin relationship enabled them to control
6 Kim, The Last Phase, pp. 15–23. George M. McCune, ‘Exchange of Envoys
between Korea and Japan during the Tokugawa Period’, Far Eastern Quarterly 5.3
(May 1946), 308–25.
7 Kim, The Last Phase, pp. 25–31.
K O R E A , C H I N A , A N D W E S T E R N B A R B A R I A N S 393
marauding mariners of Japan which, besides clearing her own coasts
of their menace, gave them a useful bargaining position against
China as a buffer (or ‘fence’ as the Chinese term fan for a vassal
state signified) on her northeastern frontier.8
The two policies had served Korea admirably in keeping the two
neighbours at bay. Korea had also remained entirely isolated from
the rest of the world: she had no Canton or Nagasaki to serve
as a window on the world beyond her immediate neighbours. The
Koreans were, therefore, wary of any move which might disrupt
Korea’s peaceful relations with China and Japan. It was this wariness
which conditioned their response to Western incursions in the early
nineteenth century.
The ‘Evil Teaching’
With the hindsight of history, it is ironical to note that the annual
tributary missions to China served as the conduit for Western influ-
ence to reach Yi Korea. Members of Korean missions were in theory
prohibited from having personal contacts with Chinese people in
Peking. But such prohibition did little in practice to stop them from
going about the city in search of Chinese books, curios and learned
friends with whom they would converse with writing brush and
paper. One place of habitual visits was the ‘South Church’
(Nan-t‘ang), where Jesuit priests in the employ of the Manchu court
as directors of the Imperial Board of Astronomy resided. They would
provide the Korean visitors with scientific works in Chinese transla-
tion and sometimes Christian writings as well. These were brought
back to Korea by mission members and found readers among a small
but creative group of scholars known as ‘Practical Learning’ (sirhak)
school.9 Academic interest in Christian teaching in the early days led
8 Chang Ts‘un-wu gives an interesting example of the use by the Koreans of the
Japan scare to press their demands on the Ch‘ing government. See his ‘Ch‘ing-Han
lu-fang cheng-ts‘e chi ch‘i shih-shih: Ch‘ing-chi Ch‘ing-Han chieh-wu chiu-fen ti tsai
chieh-shih’ [The formation and execution of the border defence policies of China
and Korea: a reinterpretation of Sino-Korean border disputes in the nineteenth
century], in his Ch‘ing-tai Chung-Han kuan-hsi lun-wen chi [Monographs on Sino-
Korean relations during the Ch‘ing period] (Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1987),
pp. 249–51.
9 One sirhak scholar left detailed notes of his visits to the South Church and of
his conversations with the Jesuit official there. See Kim T‘ae-sun, Kyogaku kara jitsu-
gaku e: ju¯hasseiki Cho¯sen chishikijin Ko¯ Daiyo¯ no Pekin ryoko¯ [From philosophy to science:
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to conversion, and the first baptism of a Korean convert took place
in Peking in 1784. Christianity spread quickly without the benefit of
missionary assistance, and when, in 1794, the first Catholic priest, a
young Chinese named Chou Wen-mo (Jacques Tsiou), entered
Korea, he is said to have found about four thousand converts.10
The government’s reaction to the ‘evil teaching’ (K: sagyo; C:
hsieh-chiao) began early, but it was sporadic and was mostly localized.
In 1801, the year of Shinyu, the first large-scale persecution occurred.
The Shinyu Persecution was primarily motivated by political rivalries
in the court, which intensified after the death of King Cho˘ngjo and
the accession to the throne of a young boy of twelve years (sui) of
age. Some influential members of the dominant faction under the
late king Cho˘ngjo were Christians, and the charge of heresy provided
a convenient reason for removing from office and even executing
them.11 The edict issued by the Queen Regent asserted that the late
king had always hoped to suppress the ‘evil teaching’ (Christianity)
through clarification of ‘correct teaching’ (Confucian teaching). But
this benign attitude had not produced the effect the late king had
desired. The edict therefore proclaimed the Queen Regent’s wish to
uphold the late king’s wish and ordered that any one persisting in
his or her evil belief should be held guilty of high treason.12
That this ‘evil teaching’ found its way into Korea from China was
well known in the Korean government. The Queen Regent’s edict
noted that ‘the teaching of Jesus and the heavenly lord’ had origin-
ated in the West but the books had been transmitted to Korea from
China. And the interrogation of the first Korean convert, Yi Su˘ng-
hun, had revealed the details of his baptism in Peking while he
accompanied his father on the 1784 tributary mission, and of the
smuggling of Christian books over the Sino-Korean border. The
Korean reaction to this knowledge was, however, not to alert the
Chinese government of the illegal activities by the Catholic priests
the travel to Peking by an eighteenth-century Korean intellectual Hung Dae-yong]
(Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1988), pp. 33–48.
10 James Huntley Grayson, Early Buddhism and Christianity in Korea: A Study in
Emplantation of Religion (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985), pp. 74–5.
11 Oda Sho¯go, ‘Richo¯ no ho¯to¯ o ryakujo shite tenshukyo¯ hakugai ni oyobu’ [An
outline of factionalism in the Yi dynasty and notes on Catholic persecution], Seikyu¯
gakuso¯ 1 (August 1930), 1–26.
12 22 Feb. 1911, Yijo sillok [The veritable record of the Yi dynasty] (Tokyo: Gaku-
shu¯in daigaku, To¯yo¯ bunka kenkyu¯sho, 1953–67), Cho˘ngjo, 2:4b. (Hereafter cited as
Sillok followed by the reign name.)
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in Peking. On the contrary, they tried to do everything within their
power to keep China out of the affairs of the ‘evil teaching’. This
they did at first by keeping information away from the Chinese; when
secrecy became impossible, then they would supply the Chinese with
a distorted, if not false, account of events in order to justify the
position of the Korean government, as the following accounts of
three incidents in the Shinyu persecution would show.
Yi Su˘ng-hun’s conduct during the 1784 tributary mission clearly
pointed to negligence on the part of the senior members of that
embassy.13 In April, the Queen Regent therefore ordered the minis-
ters of the Border Defence Command to advise her on appropriate
punishment for the three official envoys and the chief interpreter of
the 1784 mission, and the prefect of U
˘
iju district, the last of whom
was in charge of the border crossing. The ministers recommended
that only Yi Su˘ng-hun’s father (Yi Tong-uk), who was the secretary
of the mission and was now deceased, be punished posthumously.
They found the others (of whom the chief envoy only was still living)
guilty of unwitting negligence, but they feared that their punish-
ment, especially of the chief envoy who was once ‘a ceremonial guest’
at the Chinese court, might ‘hurt the basic structure of the state’
(K: sang choch‘e; C: shang ch‘ao-t‘i).14 Not provoking China’s interest in
Korean affairs was clearly more important to the Korean officials
than upholding the principle of personal responsibility in law.
It must, therefore, have come to the Koreans as an uncomfortable
surprise when, only ten days after they had made these recommenda-
tions, the ministers learned that a Chinese priest, Father Chou
Wen-mo, gave himself up to the authority in Seoul.15 For here was a
man, a Chinese, who stood beyond the law of Korea. Something like
an extraterritorial jurisdiction operated under the tributary relation-
ship with China: a Chinese national found on Korean soil had to be
13 They were the Chief Envoy Hwang In-jom, the Deputy Envoy Yi Hyang-wo˘n,
Secretary and Yi Su˘ng-hun’s father Yi Tong-uk, and the Chief Interpreter Hung
t‘aek-ho˘n.
14 13 and 14 April 1801, Pibyo˘nsa tu˘ngnok [Records of the Border Defence Com-
mand] (Seoul: Kuksa p‘yo˘ngch‘an wiwo˘nhoe, 1959–60) 19:303c–304c. I follow Fair-
bank’s translation of the term t‘i-chih: ‘basic structure of the Chinese state’. In the
context of Sino-Korean relations, the ‘basic structure’ would have extended beyond
the national boundaries and covered the whole of the established rules and customs
of the tributary relationship. John K. Fairbank, ‘The Early Treaty System in the
Chinese World Order’, in Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order, pp. 266–7.
15 24 April 1801, Sillok: Sunjo, 2:46b–47.
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extradited to China; he could be punished or executed only if the
Korean government had an explicit permission from the Chinese
government.16
The Koreans rejected the idea of repatriating Chou on two accounts.
First, the extradition procedure would take time, and that would
necessarily prolong the period of uncertainty which the Christian
purge had caused in the relations with China. Second, as some minis-
ters argued in a conference on 28 April, Chou Wen-mo possessed much
too sensitive information on Korea. As one example of this, one of the
ministers pointed to the following confessions by Chou:
Kim Ko˘n-sun [a Korean convert] said to Chou Wen-mo: ‘We are going to
build large ships and form an army. We shall sail over the ocean . . . and
strike your country to avenge the earlier humiliation.’ . . . Brother Chou
replied: ‘It certainly will not succeed. I have the correct method which I
shall teach you. You must for the time being give up your plan and follow
what I teach you.’
The same official explained to the Queen Regent: ‘This refers to the
affairs of 1636 [the Manchu invasion of Korea] . . . This appears in
Brother Chou’s confessions. If we now let the Chinese know it, they
will certainly raise some difficult questions in the various [Chinese]
yamen. If the story that our country is preparing an army to strike
China is implanted in the heart of that country, would there ever be
an end to our future worry?’ The deep-seated anti-Manchu sentiment
which underlay Korea’s seemingly total submission to the Ch‘ing
court was a secret which the Korean ministers would keep from the
Chinese at any cost. Further interrogation of Chou and Korean con-
verts satisfied the ministers that the Christians had sent no messages
to China. Chou Wen-mo was beheaded on 31 May. They did not
report the execution to the Chinese Board of Rites.17
Unfortunately for the Koreans, this was not the end of the Chris-
tian affairs. On 5 November, in the hills of Chech‘o˘n in
Ch‘ungch‘o˘ng province, a young scholar by the name of Hwang Sa-
yo˘ng was arrested. On him was found a letter, written on a piece of
thin silk and addressed to the Bishop of Peking.18 The letter
16 Chang Ts‘un-wu, ‘Ch‘ing-Han feng-kung kuan-hsi chih chih-tu-hsing fen-hsi’
[An institutional analysis of Sino-Korean tributary relations], in his Lun-wen-chi, pp.
75–6.
17 28 April 1801, Sillok: Sunjo, 2:50b–51b.
18 The letter was written on a piece of thin silk cloth. Silk cloth could be easily
folded and sewn into the clothes worn by a servant accompanying the tributary
missions to avoid detection. Yamaguchi Masayuki, Ko¯ Shiei hakusho no kenkyu¯ [A study
of Hwang Sa-yu˘ng’s letter on silk cloth] (Osaka: Zenkoku shobo¯, 1946), p. 4. For
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recounted in great detail the persecution against the Christians. It
also described the political strife between the two opposing factions
in the court, and accused one of them of political opportunism and
manipulation of anti-Christian sentiments for its own gain. The
letter also included an account of Chou Wen-mo’s religious activities
in Korea, from his arrival in 1794 to his arrest and subsequent exe-
cution. It then went on to propose some measures to restore and
protect the Korean church, which included (1) Chinese annexation
of Korea and the appointment of a Manchu prince of blood to rule
the territory; (2) seeking the Chinese emperor’s permission to send
Western missionaries to Korea; (3) dispatch of a few hundred Euro-
pean ships and several tens of thousands of soldiers to protect the
peaceful propagation of Christianity; and (4) setting up a shop near
the Sino-Korean border to serve as a secret communication depot
between the Chinese and Korean churches.19
The content of the letter shocked the Queen Regent and her min-
isters and confirmed the worst they had feared of Christianity. It
also reminded them how dangerous it was for them to assume, as
they had done, that the news of Chou Wen-mo’s execution was a safe
secret from the Peking government. It revived their fear of China’s
retribution for the unauthorized execution and, even worse, also of
Korea’s national secrets being revealed to China. It was decided,
therefore, that, if the Chinese were to know of the Chou Wen-mo
affair, it was better that they should have the Korean government’s
own account of the events before they learned it from other sources.
On 24 November, the Queen Regent ordered that a memorial be
prepared and that the tributary mission, which was shortly to depart
for Peking, be concurrently designated as a special ‘explanation’
envoy to carry the document.20
references to earlier silk letters and the importance of Korean tributary missions
in providing the vital link between the Bishop of Peking and the Korean church,
see Yamaguchi Masayuki (tr.), ‘Cho¯sen o¯koku ni okeru tenshukyo¯ no kaku-
ritsu’ [Translation of ‘Relation de l’e´tablissement du Christianism dans le royaume
de Core´e’ by Bishop of Peking, Alexandre de Gouve´a], in ibid., pp. 142–74, especially
169–70.
19 Ching Young Choe, The Rule of the Taewo˘n‘gun, 1864–1873: Restoration in Yi
Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, 1972),
p. 93 for a brief summary of this letter in English. For a detailed study with full
Chinese text and a facsimile reproduction of the original letter, see Yamaguchi, Ko¯
Shiei hakusho. For a Japanese translation and detailed annotation of the letter, see
his ‘Yakuchu¯ Ko¯ Shiei hakusho’ [The letter of Hwang Sa-yo˘ng on silk cloth, trans-
lated and annotated], Cho¯sen gakuho¯ No. 2 (October 1951), pp. 121–54.
20 Sillok: Sunjo, 3:44.
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The memorial was prepared as the envoys were being selected for
the mission. The document justified the hasty execution of Christi-
ans by emphasizing the insidiousness of the evil teaching. It pointed
to the peculiar customs among the converts, such as destroying
ancestral shrines and giving one another special names (baptism
names) for secret recognition and likened them to such Chinese anti-
dynastic secret societies as the Yellow Turbans and White Lotus soci-
eties, thus greatly exaggerating their subversive nature. It referred
to Hwang Sa-yo˘ng’s silk letter as a further evidence of the subvers-
iveness of those Christians which justified the speedy action by the
Korean government. As for Chou Wen-mo, the memorial emphas-
ized that he had to be executed immediately because he was an
important leader of this religious sect and also because he was indis-
tinguishable from other Koreans in his dress and his hair style, and
in his speech. It was only in Hwang Sa-yo˘ng’s confessions, the
memorial asserted, that Chou was said to be a Chinese, but Hwang’s
confessions could not be trusted.21
The memorial carefully avoided mention of any part of Hwang’s
letter that might prove to be embarrassing to Korea. Hwang Sa-
yo˘ng’s letter was also copied out for presentation to the Chinese
Board of Rites if it should be demanded for evidence, in which the
same care was taken to delete potentially damaging passages such
as the reference to political rivalries in the Korean court and the
proposals for protection of the Korean church.22 Then the chief and
21 2 Dec. 1801, Sillok: Sunjo, 47–48b; Ch‘ing-tai wai-chiao shih-liao: Chia-ch‘ing
[Sources on diplomatic history of the Ch‘ing dynasty: Chia-ch‘ing reign] (Peping:
Palace Museum, 1932), 1:8–9b. The point of Chou’s disguise as Korean gave the
Koreans three lines of defence. First, it excused the authority from failing to suspect
Chou might be a Chinese to begin with. Second, even if it was suspected he might
be a Chinese, by disguising himself as a Korean, Chou had turned himself from an
easily recognizable foreign criminal into more dangerous internal enemy of the
state, which made it imperative that he should be dealt with quickly before he could
harm the people further. And third, Chou had willingly given up the protection of
the suzerain government as he chose to wear Korean clothes. The reference to
Chou’s speech was a lie: Chou could not speak Korean and interrogation was con-
ducted in written Chinese. Most of the Korean converts were members of the elite
Yangban class, and at least male converts would have had little difficulty in com-
municating with Chou in written Chinese.
22 Hwang’s proposals showed a curious mixture of the contempt the Koreans felt
for the barbarian Manchu dynasty and the sense of reliance on the suzerain country.
Some of his proposals would have profoundly offended the Manchu government.
The gist of Hwang’s argument for the Chinese annexation of Korea, for example,
was as follows: The Manchu dynasty had in recent years suffered from defeat at the
hand of Western bandits, and they might now be inclined to a proposal to annex
Korea to their ancestral homeland in Manchuria in case they might lose control of
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associate envoys were carefully briefed by the Queen Regent, almost
in the manner of a schoolmaster coaching his pupils for an interview,
on how they should reply to questions from the emperor and the
Board of Rites. ‘After you are in China,’ she said,
the emperor and the Board of Rites may ask you questions. The three
envoys should then prepare to speak accurately without differing from one
another, and it is best to reply in the most plausible manner. When there
is an unexpected question of troublesome kind, you must answer reasonably
and say that it was unavoidable under the circumstances. If they blame
their border officials because the border defence was slack, they may even
execute some of their officials. Then the border areas in Korea would
become unstable. If this happens, there will easily be some conflicts. You
must speak very carefully so that you do not hurt any Chinese.23
After all these cares and anxieties, the Chinese reaction was
almost an anticlimax. The imperial edict issued on 30 January 1802
acknowledged the Korean king’s memorial, and praised the young
Korean king’s efforts to ‘exterminate’ the evil bandits in his country.
But it dismissed the allegation that these Koreans had learned these
evil beliefs from the Catholic priests in Peking. The imperial govern-
ment had employed foreigners, the edict said, as they were skilled
in mathematics and astronomy, but had strictly forbidden their mis-
sionary activities in China. They had come to China well aware of
this prohibition. The edict blandly claimed that the Korean criminals
must, therefore, have made false confessions under duress. As a
token of his support for the Korean king’s efforts to suppress Chris-
tianity, the emperor graciously ordered the Chinese border officials
to arrest and hand over to the Korean authorities the Korean fugit-
ives found on the Chinese side of the border.24
The Chinese emperor might have been blissfully unaware, but the
Koreans knew very well the fallacy in this edict.25 But the importance
China proper. The Manchus would have seen in this argument not so much a docile
invitation from an admiring subject as an offensive taunt from a hostile enemy.
The silk letter, which contained over thirteen thousand characters was, as a result,
shortened to about one thousand and five hundred characters. It is interesting to
note that the Koreans scrupulously avoided faking the letter: they deleted charac-
ters and phrases, but they did not add a single character, with the exception of
three characters added for syntactical reasons. Yamaguchi, ‘Yakuchu¯ . . .’, p. 150.
See Yamaguchi, Ko¯ Shiei hakusho, pp. 99–136 for comparison between the original
letter and the copy.
23 2 Dec. 1801, Sillok: Sunjo, 3:48b–49.
24 Ch‘ing-tai wai-chiao shih-liao: Chia-ch‘ing, 1:9b–10.
25 Christianity had formally been proscribed by the Yung-cheng emperor in 1723.
But the church survived in various parts of China—including the inland province of
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of this edict to the Koreans lay in the fact that it removed all the
fears the Koreans had felt of Chinese interference whether direct
or indirect. It tacitly admitted, by referring to Christianity as ‘evil
bandits’ (C: hsieh-fei), the view that the Christian church was an anti-
state society, and legitimatized the harsh suppression of Christianity
in Korea. It also made it known to the Koreans, by its silence, that
the execution of Chou Wen-mo was not seen as a transgression of
the rules that governed the relationship between the two countries.
And the expression of the emperor’s confidence that all the for-
eigners in the employ of the imperial government were aware of the
prohibition of Christianity signaled, on the one hand, to the Catholic
priests the emperor’s displeasure at the breach of this prohibition
and, on the other, to the Korean king an assurance that the activities
of these foreigners, outside their official duties, would not enjoy the
support of his government. Not content with these imperial assur-
ances, the Korean envoys sent an agent to speak to the priests at
the South Church: the priests were in a state of complete dejection,
the agent reported, and they denied there ever was a plan of sending
ships to Korea or of setting up a shop near the border as a secret
communication post.26
So ended the crisis in Sino-Korean relations in 1801. It was a
crisis in the eyes of the Koreans only, for it passed with the Chinese
government almost unaware that a crisis existed at all. The imperial
edict represented a great success for Korean diplomacy toward
China. Now Korea could suppress Christianity without fear of retri-
bution from China even when Chinese or other nationals were
involved. But this success did not come without a price. Though the
Shinyu persecution might have put a stop to the inflow of Christian
influence for the time being, this was bound to resume once the
vigilance over the border traffic relaxed. The only way to stop it
entirely was to plug it at the source in China. But China had refused
to act on Korea’s behalf and, the 1802 edict had essentially declared,
she would not do so in future either. So, Christian persecution went
Szechwan—until 1844, when the proscription was formally lifted. Yazawa Toshihiko
concludes in his study of the 1805 persecution of Catholics in China that the Chia-
ch‘ing emperor had naively believed that the Catholic priests in Peking had faith-
fully observed the proscription of religious activities until that year, when even some
Manchu bannermen had converted to Christianity. ‘Kakei 10 nen no Tenshukyo¯
kin‘atsu’ [The Chinese suppression of Christianity in 1805], in To¯a ronso¯ [Essays on
East Asia], No. 1 (Tokyo: Bunkyu¯do¯, 1939), p. 182.
26 11 May 1802, Sillok: Sunjo, 4:9b–10.
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on sporadically in Korea. None of these involved foreign nationals,
Chinese or European. The Korean church gradually recovered from
the 1801 persecution and even grew under the harsh conditions
imposed upon it by the government. In 1831, Korea was created
a separate diocese. In 1836 and 1837 two French priests, Fathers
Jacques-Honore´ Chastan and Pierre-Philibert Maubant, came to
Korea. They were soon joined by the newly-consecrated Bishop Laur-
ent-Joseph-Marie Imbert.27 This resulted in another major persecu-
tion in 1839. This time Korean officials were elated when they heard
of the arrest of the three French missionaries. Nor did they show
any hesitation in putting them to death.28
It was not for the Koreans to worry yet how the French might
view the killing of these Catholic missionaries. Most Korean officials
did not even know such a country existed; and the few who knew
probably could only point to the great distance that separated Korea
from that country. The Koreans were almost solely concerned about
the repercussions from China, and they had succeeded in removing
the problem of Christianity from the both present and future agen-
das of Sino-Korean diplomacy.29
‘Strange Ships’
All this would have been perfectly all right, both for Korea and for
China, had they still been isolated from the West. But European
ships began sailing into the Eastern Ocean in increasing numbers
from the early nineteenth century. And Korean knowledge about
these barbarians was woefully inadequate, even though this is not to
say they were not interested in these barbarians.
Like Christianity in Korea, it was also the regular tributary mis-
sions to China that provided the main conduit of knowledge on the
West in the early nineteenth century. The envoys of 1794 presented
a report which included a detailed description of Lord Macartney’s
embassy to the court of the Ch‘ien-lung emperor. The envoys the
27 Grayson, Early Buddhism and Christianity, p. 78.
28 13 Aug. 1839, Pibyo˘nsa tu˘ngnok, 23:113a. 15 Sept. 1839, Sillok: Ho˘njong, 6:14b.
When the news reached the court, it was proposed that the informer and the
arresting officers should be amply rewarded for their deeds.
29 The question of French or Chinese intervention never came up in their discus-
sions of the affairs of the French missionaries. See 2 Sept. 1839, 5 Nov. 1839, Sillok:
Ho˘njong, 6:14, 6:15b; Pibyo˘nsa tu˘ngnok, 23:122b–123a, 23:137a–c.
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year after gave a graphic account of the Dutch embassy, whom they
had obviously met at a banquet in the imperial palace. Lord
Amherst’s unsuccessful mission in 1816 was again reported in some
detail by the Korean envoys of the same year.
These reports always described these foreigners as ‘tributary
envoys’, and it appears this was what the Chinese host told them,
often with considerable pride and perhaps exaggeration: Macartney
was said to have come to China with a large retinue of 700 men,
of whom only one hundred were allowed to travel to Peking; Lord
Macartney and his deputy Staunton were close relatives of the
English king; the Dutch embassy was said to have come to congratu-
late the Ch‘ien-lung on the sixtieth year of his reign, and so on. The
Koreans also noted with particular interest the peremptory way in
which Lord Amherst had been ordered out of the imperial capital,
after he had refused to perform kowtow to the Chinese emperor in
1816.30
These reports were inadequate to give the Koreans any coherent
picture of the unknown world beyond the ocean. But the Koreans
were interested in England and the Netherlands primarily because
they had diplomatic (i.e. tributary) relations with China. The reports
contained sufficient information for them to judge that England was
a more powerful country than the Netherlands. And the manner of
Lord Amherst’s departure from Peking, which was closely noted by
the Korean envoys, meant that the tributary relations between
China and England had broken down. China had thus lost a means
of controlling this distant barbarian country. It signified to them that
England was a country to watch out for. It was against this back-
ground that a British ship sailed into Korean waters sixteen years
later.
On 18 July 1832, a ‘strange ship’ was sighted off the coast of
Hwanghae province. It sailed southward and anchored off Hongju in
Ch‘ungch‘o˘ng province four days later. It was an East India Company
ship, the Lord Amherst. The supercargo on board, Hugh Hamilton
30 The envoys’ reports that touch on Westerners in China are in Tongmun hwigo
[Diplomatic documents of the Yi dynasty] (Seoul: Kuksa p‘yo˘nch‘an wiwo˘nhoe,
1978), Pop‘yo˘n sok [3rd ser., cont.], ‘Sasin pyo˘ldan’ [Envoys’ reports]: Macartney’s
embassy, twelfth moon of Ch‘ien-lung 58 (2–30 Jan. 1794), 1:29b; the Dutch
embassy, intercalary second month of Ch‘ien-lung 60 (21 March–18 April 1795),
1:32b–33; Christian church in China, eleventh month of Chia-ch‘ing 10 (21 Dec.
1805–19 Jan. 1806), 2:5b–6; Dutch, Burmese and other embassies, 26 March 1806,
2:7a–b; the Russian mission in Peking, 24 April 1807, 2:8b; on England, 23 April
1810, 2:14a–b.; Lord Amherst’s embassy, 29 Dec. 1810, 2:24b–25b.
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Lindsay, had been ordered by the Select Committee ‘to ascertain
how far the northern Ports of this Empire be opened to British Com-
merce which would be most eligible and to what extent the disposi-
tion of the natives and local governments would be favourable to it.’
Lindsay was accompanied on board by the maverick missionary, Rev.
Charles Gutzlaff, who, knowing a southern Chinese dialect of
Fukien, acted as interpreter for the ship.31
The interview between the local official of Hongju and Gutzlaff
seems to have been a difficult one, as Korean officials found
Gutzlaff ’s written Chinese less than competent and unintelligible.
This difficulty, which was probably aggravated by the Hongju magis-
trate’s own ignorance of foreign affairs, makes the subsequent report
to the Korean court a jumbled collection of information on England
and the ship. It described England’s relationship with the Chinese
empire in the following terms:
[They say England] has traded with China for as long as two hundred years.
She is equal to China in power and influence, and she does not pay tribute
[to China]. [When an English envoy goes] from his country to Peking, he
does not kowtow in the imperial presence. The emperor of the Great Ch‘ing
controls distant nations by a show of conciliation. Recently because
[Chinese] officials do not faithfully observe the imperial will, the imperial
grace does not reach distant people. And, because these officials extort
bribes, many foreign merchants have been obstructed [in their trade].
The ship had also brought gifts for the Korean king and a letter
addressed to him. The Korean officials steadfastly refused to accept
these. In the end, Gutzlaff threw them overboard as the ship sailed
off, leaving the hapless officials to gather and present them to higher
officials in the provincial capital with the sure knowledge that they
would be punished for illegally accepting goods and communication
from foreigners.32
31 Hosea Ballou Morse, The Chronicle of the East India Company Trading to China,
1635–1839, 5 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926–29), 4:332.
32 Cho¯sen so¯toku fu, Cho¯sen shi henshu¯ kai (ed.), Cho¯sen shi [Chronological
abstracts of historical documents on Korea] (Keijo¯: Cho¯sen so¯toku fu, 1932–40),
6.2:416–20, for a summary account of the Lord Amherst incident. The report is in
Sillok: Sunjo, 32:27b–29b. On the punishment of the local officials, see Pibyo˘nsa tu˘ng-
nok, 22:289c–90a, 293c–4a. The story of Gutzlaff throwing the letter and gifts for
the king overboard might have been invented by the Korean official to cover up
his failure to return these to the foreigners after he had received them without
authorization from higher officials. Gutzlaff wrote: ‘Kim made the last attempt to
return the letter and presents; but when he saw that we did not receive what we
had once given, and what had been accepted, he praised our rule of conduct as most
consistent and commendable. He lamented the mean shift to which Woo had
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The Lord Amherst became a subject of much debate in the court.
In the past a ‘strange ship’ had strayed into Korean waters on two
occasions.33 In 1797, H.M.S. Providence appeared briefly off the south-
ern coast of Korea. The language barrier proved to be insurmount-
able for the ship to be identified, and no action was deemed necessary
once she had sailed off. In 1816, two British ships, the Alceste and
the Lyra, came to Ch‘ungch‘o˘ng province. The Korean officials were
satisfied when they found on one of them a paper written and affixed
with the seal of the king of England requesting provision of food
and water for the ships accompanying his envoy [Lord Amherst] to
Tientsin in case they were blown off course. Again no action was
taken.34
The ministers of the Border Defence Command thought that the
Lord Amherst might just be another ship which strayed into Korean
waters. But they also suspected that the ship might have come in
search of trade in deliberate contravention of the ban on foreign
trade and intercourse. The arrogant remarks about the strength of
their country and their strong criticism of Chinese officials also dis-
turbed them as they seemed to indicate some ulterior motive which
had to do with China. There was such a possibility, they thought,
for they learned from the papers the Lord Amherst had left behind
that sixty to seventy English ships sailed every year to Kwangtung
and Fukien ports in southern China.35 For this reason, the Border
betaken himself, by declaring his country dependent on China. He expressed his
regret at our parting, and was almost moved to tears.’ Charles Gutzlaff, Journal of
Three Voyages along the Coast of China, in 1831, 1832, & 1833, with Notices of Siam,
Corea, and the Loo-choo Islands (London: Frederick Westley and A. H. Davis, 1834),
pp. 352–3.
33 Three, if we count the Dutch ship that was wrecked on the coast of Cheju
Island in 1653. But this incident had completely faded from their memory. See Gari
Ledyard, The Dutch Come to Korea (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 1971).
34 On H.M.S. Providence, see Cho¯sen shi, 5.10:922, Sillok: Cho˘ngjo, 47:18a–b, and
Pibyo˘nsa tu˘ngnok, 18:690d. On the Alceste and the Lyra, Cho¯sen shi, 6.1:568, Sillok:
Sunjo, 19:23b–24b. The memoirs by those on board these ships shed no light on the
response of Korean officials to their arrival. See William Robert Broughton, A Voyage
of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean . . . in the years 1795, 1796, 1797, 1798 (London:
T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1804) on H.M.S. Providence; Captain Basil Hall, R.N., An
Account of a Voyage of Discovery to the West Coast of Corea, and the Great Loo-choo Island
(London: John Murray, 1818) for the Lyra; and John M’leod, Narrative of a Voyage in
His Majesty’s Late Ship Alceste, to the Yellow Sea along the Coast of Corea . . . (London:
John Murray, 1817) for the Alceste.
35 See two documents: ‘Hu Hsia-mi shang Ch‘ao-hsien wang tsou-chang’ [Hugh
Hamilton Lindsay’s memorial to the king of Korea] and ‘Hu Hsia-mi yu¨ Ch‘ao-hsien
kuan-yuan shu’ [Hugh Hamilton Lindsay’s letter to a Korean official], in Hsu Ti-
shan (ed.), Ta-chung chi: Ya-p‘ien chan-cheng ch‘ien Chung-Ying chiao-she shih-liao [Histor-
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Defence Command recommended: ‘we must take a preemptive
action to prevent future worries.’ That is, the Korean king must send
a letter to the Chinese Board of Rites, giving an account of the Lord
Amherst’s visit to Korea before the Chinese government heard of it
from foreign sources in southern China.36
In the official version of the event, the rather messy proceedings
of the Lord Amherst incident were considerably tidied up. As they did
earlier with Hwang Sa-yo˘ng’s silk letter, delicate references—such
as the claim that England was comparable to China in power and
influence—were all deleted. The barbarians were reported to have
supplicated for trade, to which the local official was said to have
replied:
A dependent country must not engage in private trade with other countries.
Moreover, our country is closest to the imperial capital. We therefore report
everything [to the imperial government] and dare not deviate from this
without proper authority.
And the king reaffirmed the determination to uphold the policy of
not having any diplomatic or trade relations with another country
as ‘the unchanging law of the dependent country.’37
The Chinese responded warmly to the Korean report. In an edict
issued on 21 November 1832, the Chinese emperor praised the
Korean king highly for ‘deep understanding of the principles of right-
eousness’ (shen-ming ta-i) and ordered bolts of satin to be bestowed
on him. The warmth of this response seems to have surprised the
Koreans, who expressed most profuse gratitude for the imperial
gifts.38 But why this extraordinary generosity on the part of the
Chinese emperor? Had the Korean king performed any extraordin-
ary service to the empire by turning away the Lord Amherst from
Korean waters?
ical materials concerning Sino-British relations before the Opium War], reprint
(Hongkong: Lung-men shu-tien, 1969), pp. 67–79. Also see Hugh Hamilton Lindsay
with Charles Gutzlaff, Report of proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China in
the Ship Lord Amherst, Extracts from Papers Relating to the Trade with China (London:
B. Fellowes, 1833), pp. 216–18, 252–6 for English texts.
36 5 Aug. 1832, Pibyo˘nsa tu˘ngnok, 22:291b.
37 24 Sept. 1832, Tongmun hwigo, wo˘np‘yo˘n sok [1st ser., cont.], ‘P‘yomin’ [Cast-
aways] 5 ‘Sanggugin’ [Chinese], 45b–47 (4:3655b–56a); also in Sillok: Sunjo,
32:29b–30b, where it appears in the entry of 16 Aug. 1832.
38 Edict, 21 Nov. 1832, Ta-Ch‘ing shih-lu [The veritable records of the Ch‘ing
dynasty] (Tokyo: Man-chou-kuo kuo-wu-yuan, 1937–38), Tao-kuang, 222:31a–b
(hereafter cited as Shih-lu followed by the reign name); Korea’s reaction thereto, 14
Feb. 1833, Sillok: Sunjo, 32:46a–b. The ministers of the Border Defence Command
remarked, ‘The great imperial honour is almost unprecedented.’
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The Lord Amherst had left Macau in March, and journeyed north-
ward along the Chinese coast. She had stopped at Amoy, Foochow,
and Shanghai as well as other smaller ports between these limits.
Then she had sailed further north to Shantung Peninsula. She then
sailed to Korea before turning back westward into the Gulf of Peh-
chili towards the strategic pass of Shan-hai-kuan on the Manchurian
border. At each of these ports Lindsay had addressed a letter to
the local official requesting trade and met with refusal. The ship’s
movements were reported to the throne in memorials from the gov-
ernors and governors-general of the coastal provinces. The emperor
bombarded these officials in return with orders urging them to
coordinate the pursuit and set up an effective barrier to stop this
roving ship. But the Chinese navy proved to be inadequate for the
task, partly because their boats were inferior in size and speed, but
also because the provincial officials were under order not to fire upon
the British ship ‘so as to avoid any incident.’39 The Lord Amherst con-
tinued to play hide-and-seek and as she came nearer to Peking, the
emperor’s ire increased.40 It was in the midst of this turmoil that
the Korean king’s memorial was received in Peking. We can imagine
the emperor’s delight at seeing the rover Lord Amherst properly
turned back by the Korean king when he was so exasperated with
the ineptitude of his own officials. Hence the generous reward of
unprecedented proportion to the Korean king.
But the Koreans never learned the whole story of the Lord Amherst
affair. The edict which bestowed praise and gifts on the Korean king
merely mentioned how righteous the Korean king was in driving
away the British ship without acceding to the demand for trade, but
did not say a word about the havoc her voyage had caused along the
Chinese coast, nor did the Koreans learn of it. The Koreans had
decided on informing China because they were concerned that the
Lord Amherst affair might cause China to suspect a collusion with the
Western barbarians if they had kept the Lord Amherst’s visit secret.
Superficially the interests of China and Korea converged completely.
The two countries were unanimous in their refusal to trade with the
Lord Amherst. Korea, as China’s faithful vassal, reported the coming
of a foreign intruder to her suzerain. And China rewarded the vas-
sal’s loyalty warmly. In reality, each country was motivated with the
39 See, for example, the edict, 16 Sept. 1832, Shih-lu: Tao-kuang, 218:19b–21.
40 For the reports and edicts, see Ta-Ch‘ing shih-lu: Tao-kuang, 211:1–2, 213:1–
2b, 213:14a–b, 213:29–30, 215:6b–10b, 215:26b–28b, 215:31, 216:3b–4, 216:15b–
16b, 217:8b–10; 218:19b–21, 219:10–11, 222:31a–b, 224:22–3, 225:16a–b.
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concern for its own domestic security. As foreign incursions became
more frequent in Korea, this seeming convergence of interest
became increasingly more difficult.
The Opium War and Sino-Korean Relations
China’s foreign relations underwent great changes in the 1840s.
China concluded formal treaties with Western powers. China opened
the five ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai to
foreign trade and residence. Hongkong was ceded to the British, and
soon outstripped Macau as a centre of Chinese coastal trade. In 1844
the ban on Christianity was formally lifted by an imperial edict.
That the Koreans were not blind to the changes that were taking
place in China’s foreign relations before and after the Opium War
is apparent in the tributary envoy’s reports. The low morale of the
populace and the drain on the national treasury caused by opium
smoking was known for some time, and the debate in the Chinese
court in 1836 on the legalization of opium was also reported to the
Korean king. The progress of the Opium War was followed keenly,
and the cession of Hongkong was noted with alarm.41
But the information on events in China was fragmentary and not
always consistent. Some important events, such as the conclusion of
the Nanking Treaty, escaped their attention, probably because the
authors of these reports failed to grasp its meaning. The military
defeat in war and the cession of Hongkong were easy enough to
understand. But the full significance of the treaty settlement was
most likely lost on the Koreans who knew nothing of the interna-
tional law. The problem was further aggravated for them because
they had never had any sustained contact with any Western country.
And it was even exacerbated by the fact that the Chinese would
never inform the Korean government of the changes taking place
within their borders. But what the Koreans learned through their
41 The envoys’ reports that touched on the Western impact on China are found
in Tongmun hwigo, pop‘yo˘n sok, ‘Sasin pyo˘ldan’: the debate on legalization of opium,
11 Aug. 1834, 2:36–7; opium causing the drain of silver, 14 Sept. 1837, 2:39; opium
smoking and low morale of the population, 7 May 1839, 2:39b–40; the Opium War,
10 April 1841, 2:40–1, and fourth month of Tao-kuang 22 (10 May–8 June 1842),
2:40–2; postwar condition of the Chinese government, such as sale of office and
punishment of officials, 28 April 1843, 2:42b–43b; treaties and domineering Eng-
land and other lesser Western countries, 4 May 1845, 2:44b–45.
T A K E M I C H I H A R A408
tributary envoys was nevertheless disturbing. As a result they began
to modify their attitude towards China. The changes were very subtle
at first but were nevertheless noteworthy.
In May 1845, H.M.S. Samarang appeared off Cho˘lla province and
sailed up and down the coast for about a month surveying the waters.
The court decided to report this to Peking following the precedent
that was set in 1832. In fact they did more than simply follow the
precedent. The document prepared did not simply report the Korean
handling of the incident. It also requested the Chinese government
to issue an order restraining the Western barbarians in Canton and
Macau from sailing into Korean waters in future.42 The Chinese
complied with this request. Ch‘i-ying, the governor-general of
Kwangtung, met with the British representative, who told him that
the ship in question had been sent by Her Majesty’s government to
chart the area and the ship had already returned home. He assured
Ch‘i-ying that the British had no intention of demanding trade with
Korea. Ch‘i-ying duly reported this to the throne, who ordered the
Board of Rites to pass this information to the Korean king.43
This bolder attitude by the Korean government probably had to
do with what they knew of the changed international situation in
42 Report to the Chinese Board of Rites, 30 Aug. 1845, Tongmun hwigo, wo˘np‘yo˘n
sok, ‘P‘yomin’ 6 ‘Sanggugin’, 14–16b. Captain Edward Belcher, R.N. Narrative of the
Voyage of H.M.S. Samarang, during the Years 1843–46, 2 vols (London: Reeve,
Benham, and Reeve, 1848) is a dry account of the voyage which gives us no informa-
tion on the people he saw.
43 Edict, 29 Oct. 1845, and Ch‘i-ying’s memorial, 21 Dec. 1845, Ch‘ou-pan i-wu
shih-mo [The complete account of the management of barbarian affairs], reprint
(Taipei: Kuo-feng ch‘u-pan-she, 1963), Tao-kuang, 74:25b–26, 74:32b–33b
(Hereafter cited as Shih-mo followed by the reign name); Chinese Board of Rites to
the Korean king, 25 Dec. 845, Tongmun hwigo, wo˘np‘yo˘n sok, ‘P‘yomin’ 6 ‘Sanggugin’,
17a–b.
Key-Hiuk Kim relies on the same memorial by Ch‘i-ying to say that Ch‘i-ying
told the British that ‘it [Korea] could not be opened to trade by China, for it was
not a part of China; it could not open itself to trade, for it was not independent.’
The Last Phase, p. 40. The relevant passage in the memorial was: ‘I [Ch‘i-ying] also
told [them] that Korea was a dependency of the Heavenly Dynasty and that, now
that a treaty has been concluded [between China and these barbarians], these bar-
barians must comply with all the stipulations, [and demanded to know] why they
were dispatching warships to Korea for surveying and [why] there was a talk of
trading.’ Ch‘i-ying’s memorial was a far more cogent document than Kim makes it
out to be, and might be said to be the first documentary evidence of the Chinese
view that the treaties China had signed with the Western powers did not extend to
Korea or other dependencies. That the Chinese government in Peking understood
Ch‘i-ying’s memorial in this spirit is apparent in the imperial edict given to him in
reply: ‘This governor-general [Ch‘i-ying] must clearly agree with [them] whereby
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China. Before the Opium War, the Koreans had no reason to take
the direct threat from barbarians so seriously. They regarded the
foreign ships that came their way as stray ships and were happy
to give them food and provision as they had traditionally cared for
castaways. That the Koreans now had specifically to ask the Chinese
to issue an order to these barbarians in Canton and Macau was a
sign that they began losing confidence in China’s ability to control
them.44
A similar, but potentially more dangerous, incident occurred in
1847 involving the French. In 1846 three French warships under
the command of Admiral Ce´cille came to Korea carrying a letter
demanding satisfaction for the 1839 execution of the three French
missionaries. These ships departed before local officials could
approach them, leaving a letter with the island’s inhabitants and
with the word that the ships would return the year after to receive
the reply. The following year Captain Lapierre who had replaced
Ce´cille as commander of the French Asiatic Squadron, sailed to
Korea with two warships, the Gloire and the Victorieuse. His plan
foundered, however, when the two ships ran aground on an island
off Cho˘lla province and he had to write the Korean authority asking
for help.
The appearance of Admiral Ce´cille’s three warships caused a panic
on the streets of Seoul,45 and the first reaction of the court was to
report the matter to the Chinese government following the preced-
ent set in 1816. But this was deemed to be unwise, as one minister
advised the throne, because the Chinese might then start asking
awkward questions, like why the Koreans had failed to report the
killing of the three foreigners to begin with.46 With Lapierre’s
arrival, the matter became a live issue again in the Border Defence
Command. It was now obvious to the ministers that the French
they must hereafter restrain their warships from going to any territory of the
dependencies of the Heavenly Dynasty . . .’, Shih-mo: Tao-kuang, 74:34–5.
44 Another sign of this waning confidence was that the Koreans also decided to
inform the Japanese of the activities of the H.M.S. Samarang. 15 Oct. 1845, Sillok:
Honjo, 12:8b–9; Pibyo˘nsa tu˘ngnok, 23:611b–c for the decision to inform Japan. Tong-
mun hwigo, pup‘yo˘n sok [4th ser., cont.], ‘pyo˘ngu˘m’ [Frontier prohibitions], 1:1–2 for
the letter to the daimyo of Tsushima.
45 This is the first occasion a panic was reported in Seoul on account of foreign
warships. This seems to signify considerable nervousness caused among the Korean
population by the Chinese defeat in the Opium War. 5 Sept. 1846, Cho¯sen shi,
6.3:147.
46 5 Sept. 1846, Sillok: Honjo, 13:11b–12.
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would keep on coming back unless they were given a reply. One
difficulty the ministers faced was they could not accept Ce´cille’s ini-
tial note as a basis for their reply, since an exchange of such diplo-
matic communications would violate the code of tributary relation-
ship which prohibited intercourse with foreigners. Fortuitously,
however, Lapierre’s ships had run aground and he had written to
the local authority asking for the provision of food for his men and of
some boats for sending messages to Shanghai. Even though Lapierre
briefly mentioned his desire to conclude a friendship treaty with
Korea, the ministers decided they could accept this as a legitimate
request from unfortunate castaways on the Korean shore, which
required some form of reply.47
The note the Koreans prepared was, in form, addressed to Lapi-
erre, but it was, in its substance, a point-by-point reply to the allega-
tions of unlawful killing of the French missionaries, contained in
Ce´cille’s earlier letter which they had rejected. It was true, the note
said, that Korea had customarily repatriated Chinese, Manchus or
Japanese to their own countries when they were arrested in Korea,
as Ce´cille had pointed out. But Imbert, Maubant and Chastan had
entered the country illegally and had associated with Korean crim-
inals. They dressed like natives and spoke Korean. When they were
arrested, they refused to say where they had come from. Even if they
had confessed it, the Koreans had never heard of France before.
These foreigners were not hapless castaways; they had infiltrated
Korea with an intent to violate her laws. As for Ce´cille’s threat that
the French emperor would not tolerate the humiliation the killing
caused him, the note responded by asking: Would the French govern-
ment have tolerated a Korean if he had disguised himself as French
and engaged in illegal activities in France? The same severe punish-
ment would have been passed on Chinese, Manchus or Japanese if
they had violated Korean law in a similar way. In an obvious refer-
ence to the execution of Chou Wen-mo, it said that there had
recently been a case involving a national of the suzerain country,
but China had not rebuked Korea for it.48
In the concluding passage of the note, the Koreans touched on
the nature of this correspondence. It said:
[Ce´cille’s] letter of last year was not in conformity with the principle of
mutual respect. It would be improper for us to reply to it. Obviously it is
47 11 Sept. 1847, Pibyo˘nsa tu˘ngnok, 23:837c–d.
48 For text, see Cho¯sen shi, 6.3:183–6. French text appears in Charles Dallet, His-
toires de l’e´glise de Core´e (Paris: Victor Palme´, 1874), 2:339–41.
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not a matter that concerns the provincial governor. Also our country is
subordinate to the Great Ch‘ing, and all our correspondence with a foreign
country must be reported [to] and approved [by the suzerain]. Now, we
cannot give you a reply unless we first obtain their approval. This is merely
what the prime minister would have meant, had he replied to you himself.49
This is a remarkable document. The arguments in defence of the
missionaries’ execution are forceful and clear, if we accept its anti-
Christian bias as valid for the time. It should dispel any doubt that
Yi officials were incompetent in diplomatic affairs. What is more
remarkable is the way they formed the note as an unofficial docu-
ment—or a kind of note verbale. The last paragraph of the note had
more than mere formal significance. For, though the Koreans had
accepted Lapierre’s letter as a plea for help from a foreign castaway,
this note not only went beyond the limit permitted for the treatment
of foreigners in distress but it probably transgressed the ban on for-
eign intercourse implied in the ‘basic structure of the state’ (K:
choch‘e; C: ch‘ao-t‘i). It was imperative for the ministers that the
French should be given an unambiguous reply to their allegations
and the demand for trade, but in the process it was also important
that China should not be alerted to their violation of the code of
tributary relations. The note was designed to achieve these two goals
at once. It gave a strong message to the French on the killing and
on the trade. Even if this note fell into the hands of Chinese officials
in Kwangtung province, it would not appear to them as illegal inter-
course with foreigners.
When the note was dispatched to Lapierre, he and his men had
departed for Shanghai on the British ships that came to their rescue.
On earlier occasions, the Koreans would have left the matter there.
Now they decided to take it further. They would report the whole
French affair to China and to request that the governor-general of
Kwangtung should be ordered to persuade the French not to return.
They would also send the note to Peking for forwarding to the French
captain in Macau.50
49 Translation based on the Japanese text in Cho¯sen shi, 6.3:183–6. Also see
Dallet, Histoires de l’e´glise, 2:339–41 for a French text. Dallet’s version is somewhat
different from the Japanese and omits reference to the prime minister.
50 Dallet says about the transmission of this letter: ‘Il [le gouvernement core´en]
envoya donc, par Pe´king, une de´peˆche qui fut remise a` M. Lapierre a` Macao.’ His-
toires de l’e´glise, 2:339. I was not able to confirm this in Korean or Chinese sources.
I accept Dallet’s statement on two accounts. The Japanese and French texts in
Cho¯sen shi and Dallet are sufficiently close to be translations from the same Chinese
text. And, for the reason I have described above, the Koreans did not think this
note would be offensive to the Chinese.
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The Korean king’s letter to the Chinese Board of Rites did not
dwell long on the killing of the French missionaries. Its justice was
so evident in the context of the traditional relationship that they did
not have to explain it in great length. Its primary objective was to
reaffirm Korea’s fundamental policy of upholding the tributary rela-
tionship in the face of changing circumstances.
The letter described the grounding of two ‘strange ships’ on 10
August on an island in Cho˘lla province, and the kind treatment
given these shipwrecked men while they were camped ashore. It
then went on to make two points of note: before he left on 13
September, Captain Lapierre had addressed a letter to the Korean
official, in which he included some papers titled ‘regulations’ (K:
changjo˘ng; C: chang-ch‘eng) and ‘notifications’ (K: kosi; C: kao-shih),
which, I suspect, were texts of the Sino-French treaty and notices
issued by the Kwangtung provincial authority acknowledging for-
eign missionary activities. Lapierre had also been accompanied by
two Chinese from Kwangtung province, who, he claimed, came as
interpreters by the permission of the Kwangtung governor-
general.51 The letter therefore emphasized to the Chinese that
they had no intention of entering into any relations with France
and requested the Chinese government to impress this fact on
the French in China.
Our small country is located in the remote corner of the eastern extreme
and is separated from the Western countries by many oceans. No letters
reach there, and no boats or carts go there. We have heard for the first
time of a country called France. Moreover, we are duty-bound to report to
you on frontier affairs. In 1816, when we reported about the English ship,
we were commended and honoured by the emperor; in 1832, when we
reported on an English ship again, we received a special edict instructing
the people of that country not to go to Korea again. Our small country is
all in one mind in relying on the superior country with respect and gratit-
ude. Now this French affair is very different from the English affairs before.
Moreover, judging from the letters they left behind, it appears this is a
country which is controlled by the superior country in its maritime trade
and traffic. We would trouble your Board to submit this to the emperor and
request an imperial edict to let the governor-general of Liang-Kuang
51 The Korean official who was dispatched from Seoul to treat with the Gloire and
the Victorieuse was not at all impressed by these two Cantonese ‘interpreters’, who
seemed to him rather inadequate in written Chinese, and not at all proficient in
French, as this official observed from the way Lapierre had difficulties in communic-
ating with them. The Korean suspected Lapierre was making a false claim to
impress him. He was probably right. See the report of Pang U-so˘, no date, Tongmun
hwigo, pop‘yo˘n sok, ‘Sasin pyo˘ldan’, 2:49b–60.
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instruct [the French] first so that there would not be any more
disturbances.52
The Korean documents were dispatched to Peking with a ‘calendar-
returning’ mission. An imperial edict was issued on 6 November
ordering these Korean documents to be sent to Ch‘i-ying for him to
act on. Ch‘i-ying accordingly sent a diplomatic note to Lapierre.
Ch‘i-ying’s note has been a source of some confusion among histor-
ians. As it purports to quote extensively from the Korean letter to
the Board of Rites, Mary C. Wright used this as such to support her
contention that Korea’s diplomacy was rigid and uninformed,53 a
view which does not accord with the resourceful argument presented
in the text or with the dexterity with which its transmission to Lapi-
erre was achieved. Ch‘i-ying’s note, in fact, did not simply copy out
the original Korean letter; it took a considerable liberty in par-
aphrazing the original document so that, even though Ch‘i-ying was
pressing on Lapierre the views the Koreans put forward, the tone of
the argument was changed from that of dignified, reasoned suasion
to whining supplication, which was more in accord with Ch‘i-ying’s
own style of diplomacy which consisted of appeasing the Western
barbarians with flattering and conciliatory words. It was Ch‘i-ying’s,
and not Korea’s, words that made the Korean position look rigid and
uninformed. The Korean letter, as presented in Ch‘i-ying’s note,
read like this:
The land of our country is remote and small, and our people poor. Since its
produce is meagre, there is really no economic strength to conduct trade
with foreign countries. And also Christianity may really encourage people
to do good; but our people are stupid and difficult to educate. Moreover,
they had not heard of this teaching. It would really be difficult to teach
them.
Having thus presented the Korean view, Ch‘i-ying begged for Lapi-
erre’s sympathy and understanding for this small country, as the
latter, ‘with your [Lapierre’s] intelligence which surpasses all other
52 Eighth month of Tao-kuang 27 (9 Sept.–8 Oct. 1847), Tongmun hwigo, wo˘np‘yo˘n
sok, ‘P‘yomin’ 6 ‘Sanggugin’, 17b–19b.
53 Mary C. Wright wrote: ‘On the Chinese point that Christians were law-abiding
and Christian teaching not immoral, the Korean letter remarked that this might
be so but that the Korean peple were too stupid to understand anything of which
they had not heard before; moreover the country was too poor to engage in trade.’
‘The Adaptability’, p. 376.
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people’, would certainly agree with the reasonableness of the Korean
position.54
Ch‘i-ying then sent a memorial to Peking expressing his view that
the French were unlikely to disturb Korea again as about 400 French
troops had already been sent home from Macau.55 A while later,
Ch‘i-ying reported he had received a note from Lapierre. The note
concerned mostly the treatment of Christian missionaries in various
parts of China; but, since it made no mention of Korea except to
say that Lapierre had never requested trading concessions from any
country, Ch‘i-ying took this to mean France was no longer interested
in Korean trade. He only feared Lapierre might still go back to
Korea to reclaim the cargoes he had left behind. Since it was imposs-
ible to stop him, Ch‘i-ying proposed to the throne that the Board of
Rites should tell the Koreans to receive the French courteously in
order to avoid further incidents. The imperial edict merely ordered
Ch‘i-ying to keep an eye on these barbarians and do what he could
to stop them from going back to Korea, but ignored this sensible
proposal.56
‘Foreign Disturbances’
One wonders what might have happened if the emperor had adopted
Ch‘i-ying’s proposal and had indeed warned the Korean king of the
necessity to avoid further incidents with the French. Would it have
led to Korea changing her seclusionist policy towards France and
Britain? The answer must, unfortunately, be ‘probably not’. For
Korea to adopt a more open attitude to the West, she would have
had to know far more about the Western world and recognize these
barbarian countries as a force that was at least as formidable as, if
not more than, her mighty neighbour China. For, in spite of the
Opium Wars and the Taiping rebellions, China still remained the
only tangible power to reckon with in the eyes of the Koreans. These
‘internal disturbances and external aggressions’ (nei-yu wai-huan)
were certainly a sign of the Ch‘ing dynasty’s declining power, but it
did not change the fundamental fact of Korea’s security being
54 Ch‘i-ying to Lapierre, enclosure in his memorial received at court on 23 Dec.
1847, Shih-mo: Tao-kuang, 78:24b–25b.
55 Ch‘i-ying’s memorial received at court on 23 Dec. 1847, Shih-mo: Tao-kuang,
78:23–24b.
56 Ch‘i-ying’s memorial received at court 14 Feb. 1848, and edict, Shih-mo: Tao-
kuang, 79:3b–5b.
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dependent first and above all upon maintaining a friendly relation-
ship with China, which the tributary relationship had provided for.
The relations with all the other countries were acceptable only so far
as they were entirely compatible with it. Her long and unperturbed
relationship with Japan had been built on this premise. If Korea were
to open her door to Western countries, that, too, had to be done on
the same premise. An open diplomatic relationship with Western
countries would not have appeared safe to the Koreans unless these
countries were powerful enough to check a Chinese threat to Korea.
The change in Korea’s position towards the Western barbarians
depended on how much she would come to recognize the power of
the West relative to China. So long as Korea saw China as a greater
threat than Western countries, her policy of dependence upon China
had to continue. And so long as the sole provider of knowledge on
these Western countries and China’s dealings with them was China
herself, it was unlikely that Korea would form any other opinion.
The Korean envoys reported on the great Taiping rebellion in
South China, but the disorder in distant South China failed to stir
the Koreans to take a fresh look at the Sino-Korean relationship.57
The news of the sack of Peking by the Anglo-French allied forces and
the flight of the emperor to Jehol was brought to Seoul in January
1861. It caused such a great consternation among Koreans that
many fled the capital. There was a fear that the Chinese emperor
might retreat further northeast and even seek refuge on Korean soil,
which would inevitably bring Chinese interference in Korean affairs
and even invite a Western attack on Korea.58 The Korean court
decided to dispatch a special embassy ostensibly to enquire after the
emperor’s well-being, but undoubtedly motivated by a more mun-
dane desire to obtain up-to-date information in China, without wait-
ing for the return of the regular tributary mission which was not
expected until late spring.
When the ‘enquiry mission’ reached Peking, the Chinese govern-
ment reacted with an ostentatious show of magnanimity by
bestowing on them various gifts and an edict full of warm praise for
their loyal act. But it rejected the request from the embassy for a
57 The earliest envoys’ report to refer to the Taiping rebellion was in 1854, which
reported the fall of Nanking. But the references to the Taipings are generally short
and do not seem to show the same degree of concern as towards the Anglo-French
campaign in North China in 1860. See the envoys’ reports between 1854 and 1866
in Tongmun hwigo, wo˘np‘yo˘n sok, ‘Sasin pyo˘ldan’ 2:61–80b.
58 Cho¯sen shi, 6.3:601, entry of 10 March 1861; Kim, The Last Phase, p. 42.
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permission to travel to Jehol on the grounds of the emperor’s ill
health.59 By then, the foreign troops had been evacuated from
Peking, and China had signed new treaties with Britain, France and
Russia. In the meantime, the regular embassy returned to Seoul and
the three envoys reported to the king that the foreign barbarians
had compelled the Chinese government to accept their terms of
peace, and that the capital city itself had recovered its former tran-
quillity. The enquiry mission, which returned two months later, also
told of the restoration of calm in Peking and of increasingly success-
ful anti-Taiping campaigns led by more able provincial officials out-
side the capital.60
But nowhere do we find evidence that, through this crisis in China,
the Koreans were made aware of the potentially more insidious con-
cessions which China had been compelled to make to the powers.
These included the opening of several ports in North China including
Newchwang in Manchuria, the concession to the French Catholic
missionaries of the right to own properties in the interior of China,
and the cession of the trans-Ussuri region to Russia, the last of which
exposed Korea to direct threat from the Russians across the newly
created eleven-mile-long land border on her northeastern frontier.
Thus, neither the Taiping rebellion nor the Chinese defeat in the
Second Opium War compelled the Koreans to make a fundamental
reappraisal of Korea’s policy of dependence on China. On the con-
trary, the spectacle of China’s dynastic decline, of which these
internal disturbances and the external aggressions were both causes
and symptoms according to the Confucian ideology of state, seems
to have hardened the Korean resolve to resist all demands for foreign
trade and to root out all domestic unrest.
It was at this juncture, in 1864, that the Taewo˘n‘gun assumed
power as a de facto regent for his son, King Kojong. A man of forceful
personality, he set out on an ambitious reform plan to strengthen
the power of the Korean state and, if he had been at all affected by
the news of China’s domestic and foreign imbroglios, to spare it a
similar fate.61 One of these measures was the Catholic persecution
of 1866.
59 The Korean king’s letter to the Board of Rites, 6 Feb. 1861, and the Board’s
reply, 7 April 1861, Tongmun hwigo, wo˘np‘yo˘n sok, ‘Mun‘an’ [Enquiry after the
emperor’s health], 2:1, 2:2b–3b. The emperor’s health was probably not very good;
he was to die in Jehol on 22 August.
60 Audience of the three envoys, 6 May 1861, and of the Jehol envoys, 27 July
1861, Sillok: Ch‘o˘ljong, 13:4, 13:6.
61 On the Taewo˘n‘gun’s reforms, see Choe, The Rule of the Taewo˘n‘gun. For more
critical assessment, Palais, The Politics and Policy.
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A curious story is told of the origin of this persecution. From about
1860, the Koreans had noted with some concern signs of increasing
Russian activities along the northeastern frontier. Prompted by a
desire to secure government approval for their faith, two Catholic
officials proposed to the Taewo˘n‘gun that Korea should conclude an
anti-Russian alliance with France and England, and that the French
missionaries would help negotiate such an alliance with the French
minister in Peking. The plan fell through because the French priests
were unwilling to involve themselves in politics. The Taewo˘n‘gun is
said to have shown considerable interest in the proposal, though he
eventually rejected it for a fear that such a treaty might make China
suspicious.62 If this story is true, it is interesting that the Taewo˘n‘gun
should have considered an alliance with Western powers even for a
brief moment, suggesting that he might not have been as anti-
foreign as he was generally thought to be. Unfortunately, the pro-
posal revealed to the government the presence of French missionar-
ies in the country, and the persecution began soon thereafter. At
first, it seems to have been aimed more at these foreigners than at
Korean converts at large. The persecution lasted barely one month.
Ten French priests were arrested and quickly put to death between
February and March, but the number of Koreans executed during
this month probably never exceeded thirty to forty.63
In carrying out the execution of these French priests, the Korean
government had never thought of international repercussions. The
current purge of the ‘evil teaching’ reminded Korean officials of the
last great purge in 1839. The comparison they drew, however, was
not the killing of the French priests that might cause the French to
send warships to Korea again, but rather the traitorous nature of the
Korean Christians who associated with these beastly barbarians.64
Lapierre’s visit to Korea in 1847 had completely failed to offer a
diplomatic lesson to the Koreans.
The news of the Christian purge was carried to China by Felix-
Clair Ridel, one of the three French priests who escaped arrest. He
went by a junk to Chefoo and then to Tientsin, where he told
Admiral Pierre-Gustave Roze, the commander of the French Asiatic
Squadron, of the two compatriots still in Korea. Roze consulted the
French charge´ in Peking, Henri de Bellonet. On 13 July, Bellonet
sent the following extraordinary note to the Tsungli Yamen.
62 Choe, The Rule of Taewo˘n‘gun, p. 96 for a summary of this episode.
63 Ibid.; Cho¯sen shi, 6.4:64–5, 67–70, gives ten names, but the number of French
priests killed is given as nine in Choe, The Rule of Taewo˘n‘gun, p. 96.
64 For example, 10 March 1866, Sillok: Kojong, 3:5a–b.
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‘According to the communication I received recently from Korea,’
the note said,
it is said that in March this year the king of Korea suddenly issued an order
whereby two French bishops, nine [French] and seven native missionaries,
and numerous converts were killed. By such savagery [Korea] has chosen
to defeat herself. Because it is a tributary country of China, it is only reason-
able that I should inform your excellency we are sending troops to punish
the guilty. . . . Therefore, I hereby declare that all our warships will go to
Korea to take that country temporarily. We shall then await an order from
France to determine who should be appointed the king to rule that land. I
have on several occasions requested your yamen to issue the passports to
the missionaries, but you have always given me evasive answers, saying that,
even though Korea paid tribute to China, it was autonomous (K: chaju; C:
tzu-chu) in all its state affairs and that, therefore the Treaty of Tientsin did
not apply to it.65
Although Bellonet’s note was hostile to China, Bellonet’s point
about Korea being an ‘autonomous’ country did not contradict the
view the Tsungli Yamen held. The ministers of the Tsungli Yamen
had only recently declared with regard to Korea not only to the
French charge´ but also the British minister that China’s treaties
with the Western countries did not apply to her dependencies and
that China did not directly interfere in the affairs of her dependen-
cies.66 The Yamen’s dispatch to the French minister avoided this
legal point, and confined itself to a moral suasion.
Seeing, however, that when two countries come to war it involves the lives
of their people, as it will in this case—and, therefore, I cannot but endeav-
our to bring about a solution (C: p‘ai-chieh; K: pehe) of the difficulty between
them—as the Koreans have killed a number of the missionaries, it seems
to me that it would be best to inquire beforehand into the proofs and merits
of the affair, and ascertain what were the reasons for this step, so that, if
possible, a resort to arms might be avoided. I . . . suggest such a course for
your excellency’s consideration.67
65 Bellonet to the Tsungli Yamen, enclosure in the memorial of the Tsungli
Yamen, received at court 18 July 1866, Shih-mo: T‘ung-chih, 42:54a–b. Choe, The
Rule of the Taewo˘n‘gun, p. 97 gives a different translation, which is quoted from Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, enclosure in No. 122, Burlingame
to Seward, Peking, 12 Dec. 1866.
66 The Tungli Yamen to Thomas Wade, and the Tsungli Yamen to Bellonet,
enclosures in the memorial of the Tsungli Yamen, received at court 18 July 1866,
Shih-mo: T‘ung-chih, 42:53a–b, 54b–55.
67 The Tsungli Yamen to Bellonet, enclosure to memorial of the Tsungli Yamen,
received at court 18 July 1866, Shih-mo: T‘ung-chih, 42:54b–55. The translation fol-
lows Choe, The Rule of the Taewo˘n‘gun, pp. 97–8, which quotes from Papers Relating to
the Foreign Relations of the United States, enclosure in No. 122, Burlingame to Seward,
Peking, 12 Dec. 1866.
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The Tsungli Yamen’s tactics was probably to stall the French with
the vague offer of mediation, while they had time to forewarn the
Koreans of the impending French invasion, in the hope that the
Koreans would somehow be able to avoid the conflict. What they
meant by p‘ai-chieh68 was probably little more than passing the
information to the Koreans and, if the Korean reply was received,
forwarding it to the French with a few words of restraint. There was
little likelihood of China risking a forceful intervention against the
French naval forces, at any rate so soon after her defeat in the
Second Opium War. The Board of Rites duly sent to the king of
Korea a copy of the correspondence exchanged between Bellonet and
the Tsungli Yamen.
When the Board’s letter reached Seoul on 16 August, however, it
seems to have given the Koreans an impression that the Tsungli
Yamen would undertake some form of active intervention rather
than mere mediation. In their reply to the Board’s letter, the
Koreans justified the killing of the French missionaries by pointing
out, as they had done in 1839, that they were in effect Korean crim-
inals who had dressed like the natives and colluded with native ren-
egades in most serious crimes. They had never had hostile feeling
towards France—how could there be any grudge against a country
which they hardly knew? They affirmed the policy of seclusion with
a phrase from Chinese classics: It was ‘the permanent canon of the
vassal state’ (K: subang chi yijo˘n; C: shou-pang chih i-tien) that ‘people
have no foreign relations, they close their market, and they jeer at
foreign tongues.’ They then professed their ignorance of foreign
affairs and expressed profuse gratitude to the Chinese government
68 According to a standard Chinese dictionary Tz‘u-hai, the term is derived from
p‘ai-nan chieh-fen (‘to remove difficulties and resolve conflict’), which describes the
deed of a Lu Chung-lian during the Warring State period. When the army of power-
ful Ch‘in laid siege to Chao capital, Lu undertook single-handedly to persuade the
Ch‘in king to lift the siege. When the king of Chao offered Lu a reward of gold, the
latter replied that the gentleman valued ‘eradicating calamities, removing difficult-
ies and resolving conflicts for other people; [he] does not take anything [for
reward].’ Shu Hsin-ch‘eng et al. (eds), Tz‘u-hai, reprint of 1947 revised ed. (Hong
Kong: Chung-hua shu-chu¨, 1974), p. 580.
This classical reference was not only apt for the situation as the Koreans saw it,
but it would have suggested to them a more active intervention than what the
Tsungli Yamen had in mind.
A contemporary Chinese–English dictionary translates p‘ai-chieh as ‘to arrange
any difficulties; to put an end to a quarrel’, admirably suggesting the ambiguity of
the action envisaged from that of a passive intermediary to that of an active fixer.
Robert Morrison, Dictionary of the Chinese Language, in 3 parts, 6 vols (Macau: East
India Company’s Press, 1815–1822), part II, vol. 1, p. 633.
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for the ‘mediation’ (p‘ai-chieh) attempt by the Tsungli Yamen, ending
the letter with a remark: ‘We hereby give you the complete account
of the affair in advance, and would trouble your Board to forward it
in a memorial so that it might be put into practice.’69
The last remark is significant, for it suggests that the Korean reply
was not written in opposition to the Chinese suggestion to accommod-
ate the French demands. The underlying assumption here was, as the
Koreans saw it, that China and Korea were agreed on the point of the
inviolability of Korean seclusion. The Chinese might have wished to
urge flexibility on the Koreans by their exceptional act of forewarning;
but the text of their communication stated categorically, as the opin-
ion of the Tsungli Yamen which had the support of the emperor, that
China could not, and would not, force Korea to open her door to foreign
intercourse. To the Koreans the Yamen’s offer of ‘mediation’
(p‘ai-chieh) coupled with what, to them, seemed to be this firm support
of Korea’s seclusion policy signified an active support by the Tsungli
Yamen for Korea against the French. The purpose of their reply to the
Chinese Board of Rites was to thank the Tsungli Yamen for this con-
crete support and to provide a detailed brief of the affair in order to
help the Chinese to put the Korean case more effectively to the
French. As the ministers in council remarked, when they proposed that
a reply be sent to the Board of Rites, ‘We must express our gratitude
for the mediation (p‘ai-chieh) by the Tsungli Yamen and the forwarding
of papers by the Board of Rites. And we must prepare a complete
account of the case.’70
Admiral Roze sailed on 18 September aboard the flagship Primaug-
uet, accompanied by two other ships, the De´roule`de and the Tardif. The
French ships surveyed approaches to the Korean capital, at one point
sailing up the Han River within the viewing distance from Seoul.
The appearance of the French ships so near the capital caused a
panic in the Korean court, but no resistance was offered. On 1
October the ships sailed back to Chefoo in China to prepare for
formal campaign.71
The departure of the black ships without any incident was still
seen as a sign of the success of the Chinese intervention. On 3
69 The Korean king’s letter, presented to the emperor on 29 Sept. 1866, Shih-mo:
T‘ung-chih, 44:12b–13b.
70 17 Aug. 1866, Pibyo˘nsa tu˘ngnok, 26:199a–b; Ilso˘ngnok: Kojong p‘yo˘n [Record for
daily reflection: Kojong’s reign] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1967–72),
Kojong 3.7.8.
71 Choe, The Rule of the Taewo˘n‘gun, pp. 98–9.
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October, it was decided that the forthcoming tributary embassy
should also be designated a ‘thanking mission’ (K: sau˘nsa; C:
hsieh-en-shih) specially to show Korea’s gratitude for the Tsungli
Yamen’s efforts.72
The return of the French forces—now with seven warships—and
the attack on the Island of Kanghwa on 16 October, however, radic-
ally changed the situation. The Taewo˘n‘gun set up a central military
command known as Kiboyo˘nhae sunmuyo˘ng (Metropolitan and Mari-
time Defence Command) with his trusted general Yi Kyo˘ng-ha as
commander-in-chief, and prepared the country for war with the
French.73 In this frenzy of activities, he also ordered that a letter be
dispatched to the Chinese Board of Rites to declare Korea’s deter-
mination to fight on.
The letter was unlike anything the Korean king had ever sent
to China. Its language was strong and uncompromising, verging on
intransigence. It declared that Korea had never deviated in her his-
tory from the teaching of Duke Chou and Confucius, and that she
was not going to let some Western teaching contaminate her land.
It described in a highly idealistic tone the various reforms the Tae-
wo˘n‘gun had carried out to improve the government and the welfare
of the Korean people. It then thanked the Chinese government for
helping to quash the rumour of war through its intervention
(p‘ai-chieh) with the French. As for foreign trade, it haughtily pro-
claimed Korea produced only enough to keep her people in a con-
tented state: she had no goods to trade with the foreigners. They
would not get anything they wanted from Korea, and Korea wanted
nothing from them. It proclaimed that Korea was forthwith prohibit-
ing all foreign goods in the country. Those which had been imported
into Korea from the markets in China would now be confiscated and
burnt by the authority. If these foreigners were in possession of cor-
rect reason, the letter said, how could they invade the land of Korea
which had nothing to do with them? It reminded the Chinese that
the Chinese officials were in a position to know much better than
themselves the foreigners’ grand designs. Would not the ministers
72 3 Oct. 1866, Ilso˘ngnok, Kojong 3.8.25. This thanking mission was performed
even though the Tsungli Yamen’s failure had been made painfully apparent by the
hostility with the French. It may be that the mission started on its journey before
the fighting began. See the Korean king’s memorial to the Chinese emperor, 30
Nov. 1866, Tongmun hwigo, wo˘np‘yo˘n [1st ser.], ‘Yangbak cho˘nghyo˘ng’ [Reports on
foreign ships], 13a–b.
73 Choe, The Rule of Taewo˘n‘gun, pp. 101–2.
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of the Tsungli Yamen talk firmly to these foreigners so that they and
the Koreans could each live in peace?74
This was indeed a very strong protest to the Chinese government
from the Koreans that the Tsungli Yamen’s mediation had not only
failed but that China’s accommodation of the Western influence
itself was threatening Korea. The profession of Korea’s poverty was
not an expression of humble supplication; it was, rather, a haughty
declaration of her firm determination to continue the policy of seclu-
sion and a sharp reminder to China that the superior country was
not fulfilling its duties of protecting the inferior country.
It did not take this letter from the Korean king to remind the
ministers of the Tsungli Yamen that the opening of hostility changed
the situation in Korea. Roze had ordered the expedition against
Korea even before Bellonet had formally notified the Tsungli Yamen
of it, giving the Chinese no time for intervention of any kind. And
the Tsungli Yamen’s response merely affirmed the French right to
declare a naval blockade as it was stipulated in Article 31 of the
Treaty of Tientsin and lamely repeated the earlier demand for
investigation and postponement of naval action.75 And the Tsungli
Yamen was at any rate certain that Korea would be militarily
defeated, as China had been, at the hands of the Western invaders,
and the defeat would lead to other issues than the killing of the
Catholic fathers. In a memorial received by the throne on 11 Nov-
ember, the Yamen ministers pointed out that after the war the
French demand would no longer be confined to the question of Chris-
tian missionaries. France would certainly demand trade as well as
indemnities. Even worse, England and the United States would join
with France to make similar demands on Korea. But Korea would
certainly refuse to compromise on these points:
Now the letter from Korea deeply rejects trade and propagation of
Christianity. We wonder if [Korea] has ever carefully considered the bene-
fits and the harms [of trade and Christianity]. As for indemnities, their
harm is equal [to the other two]. Our yamen cannot put even a slight
74 The Korean king’s letter, enclosure in Prince Kung’s memorial, 21 Nov. 1866,
Shih-mo: T‘ung-chih, 45:22b–25b.
75 On 5 October, Roze issued two proclamations, in which he explained to the
general public the aim of the campaign and declared the blockade of the Han River.
The Far Eastern fleet sailed for Korea on 11 October. It was not until 24 October
that Bellonet informed the Tsungli Yamen of the Korean blockade. Choe, The Rule
of the Taewo˘n‘gun, p. 100; Bellonet to the Tsungli Yamen, 24 Oct. 1866, and the
Tsungli Yamen to Bellonet, 4 Nov. 1866, enclosures in the Tsungli Yamen’s memor-
ial, received at court on 12 Nov. 1866, Shih-mo: T‘ung-chih, 45:14–15.
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pressure on Korea. We would request your edict to instruct the Board of
Rites to [consider] how to inform the king of Korea that he should plan
for all eventualities and take appropriate measures without the slightest
oversight.76
The Tsungli Yamen feared France was using the missionary affair
as an excuse for trade, and once the trade became an open issue,
England and the United States were bound to join in.
The debacle the Tsungli Yamen had feared for Korea did not come
about, as Admiral Roze was compelled to withdraw his troops from
Korea on 18 November. The French had occupied the strategic
island of Kanghwa, but they were inadequately prepared for the pro-
tracted warfare which the determined resistance by the much larger
Korean force imposed on them. But the Tsungli Yamen’s fear was
based less on the immediate outcome of the war than on the long-
term concern that the foreign pressure on Korea would continue
and would sooner or later increase to the point where she would be
compelled to respond to the demands for concessions. In December,
even after the hostility ended, the Tsungli Yamen ministers were
apprehensive that the French still harboured some design on Korea,
and wanted the Board of Rites to pass the information to Korea so
that ‘if France dispatched warships [to Korea] again in future, she
might be able to take appropriate action herself and to plan for all
eventualities. This is most important.’77 The Board of Rites, whose
task it was to oversee the dispatch and the receipt of correspondence
with the Korean king, took a different view. It was less interested
in the future development of the international situation and consid-
ered that the Chinese concern in the affair had come to an end when
it received the glowing report of the Korean victory over the French,
which the Korean tributary mission had now brought to Peking. The
ministers of the Board of Rites therefore objected to the Tsungli
Yamen’s proposal. The Tsungli Yamen was not moved by these
reports. It memorialized again on 27 February reiterating the
importance of giving warning to the Korean king again only to find
its counsel ignored by the throne.78
76 Memorial from the Tsungli Yamen, 11 Nov. 1866, Shih-mo: T‘ung-chih, 45:10b–
13b.
77 The Tsungli Yamen’s memorial, received on 20 Dec. 1866, Shih-mo: T‘ung-chih,
46:12–17.
78 The Tsungli Yamen’s memorial, received at court on 27 Feb. 1867, Shih-mo:
T‘ung-chih, 47:8b–10; the letters from the Korean king, reporting the victory, enclos-
ures in the memorial of the Board of Rites, received at court on 16 Feb. 1867, ibid.,
47:1–5.
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Conclusion
This survey of the Korean handling of the foreign incursions has
shown that the Koreans consistently tried to deal with these incid-
ents within the framework of traditional Sino-Korean relations.
Whenever a wayward incident occurred, the Koreans made efforts,
at times of dubious nature, to present their case to the Chinese
court in as favourable a light as possible. They were also quite
ready to withhold information from the Chinese when it seemed
safe. They were careful to be seen to be dealing with these foreign
incidents openly and above board. They feared most arousing the
Chinese suspicion of their anti-Chinese (and especially anti-
Manchu) sentiment. Once such a suspicion was implanted in the
Chinese mind, the Chinese were bound to interfere in Korean
affairs directly as they had done in the early days of the Ch‘ing–
Korean relations.
The Koreans paid close attention to China’s external relations as
well as her internal conditions both before and after the Opium War.
Information-gathering was one task each tributary mission con-
ducted with considerable vigour even at the risk of offending the
Chinese host.79 It was through the reports of the tributary envoys
that the Koreans learned of China’s defeats in the Opium War and
the Arrow War. The sack of Peking by the Anglo-French forces
alarmed the Koreans, but it seems to have had little effect on
Korea’s foreign policy thinking, probably because the Koreans did
not know the full extent of the territorial and other concessions
which the Chinese had made to gain the peace settlement, and also
because, with the restoration of calm in the capital and the suppres-
sion of the Taiping rebellion, China posed just as much threat as
before on the Sino-Korean frontier.80 The effect of China’s
weakening position in the face of foreign incursion is apparent in the
increased aggressiveness of Korea’s diplomacy. After the Samarang
case, the Korean government, rather than simply informing the
Board of Rites, began asking the Chinese government to forward
79 Chang Ts‘un-wu, ‘Ch‘ao-hsien tui-Ch‘ing wai-chiao ji-mi-fei chih yen-chiu’ [A
study of the secret service funds in Korean diplomacy towards China], in his Lun-
wen-chi, pp. 112–16.
80 We might recall that the panic among the population of Seoul in 1861 was
caused by their fear of vanquished Manchu forces withdrawing to their homeland
on the Manchurian–Korean border. See above, ‘Foreign Disturbances’.
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their request to the Kwangtung provincial authority to stop the for-
eigners from sailing to Korea. In the case of the two French ships,
the Gloire and the Victorieuse, they even succeeded in sending their
communication to a French captain in Macau through the official
channel of the Chinese government.
The French invasion of 1866 strained the traditional Sino-Korean
relations. In the face of the aggressive French naval force, all the
initiatives and innovations which the Koreans had devised in the past
decades in dealing with the Western barbarians proved ineffective.
The Chinese government’s response, on which the success of Korean
measures was predicated, was ill-defined and tentative. But, when
the Tsungli Yamen made an attempt to intercede with the French,
it seemed to the Koreans to be an active intervention on their behalf,
and the Koreans readily accepted the Chinese assistance. When the
French naval attack made the inadequacy of this intervention pain-
fully clear, the Koreans chose to go to war with the French. The
alternative of a negotiated settlement was, under the circumstances,
tantamount to a surrender, and would have compelled Korea into an
uncharted water of open trade and diplomatic relations with France
and, undoubtedly, other Western countries. Understandably such an
alternative did not even become an issue in the debate of the Korean
court at a time when the Koreans were preparing frantically for war
to defend their capital.
But there was a more fundamental reason why the Koreans would
not consider a negotiated settlement with the French. In the letter
the Korean king addressed to the Board of Rites during the war
against France, he proudly proclaimed that Korea had always fol-
lowed the way of the sacred teaching of the Duke Chou and Con-
fucius, thereby insinuating that the Chinese had departed from the
way of the proper Sino-Korean relations based on the teaching of
these sages.81 This inherent sense of dissatisfaction with China’s
recent policy of allowing Western barbarians to come to Korea was
nowhere more apparent than in the wijo˘ng ch‘o˘ksa (‘defend the ortho-
dox and reject the heterodox’) argument which gained prominence
during the French invasion. Its protagonist, Yi Hang-no, equated
the Western barbarians with the beast and argued that ‘those who
advocate peace with the foreign bandits are on their side’, and
advised the government to maintain this ‘great distinction’ between
81 See note 74.
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the traditional civilized way within the Korean borders and the realm
where humans had fallen into beastly ways.82
What is most striking in these arguments, when they are seen in
the context of traditional Sino-Korean relations, is the strong anti-
Chinese tone that underscores their violently anti-foreign expres-
sions. Neither of them named China directly, but by insisting that
Korea had strictly adhered to the correct way of the sages and that
its strict observance alone offered the way out of the crisis, they
both blamed the present crisis on China which had made too many
concessions to the Western barbarians in violation of the Confucian
tenets which bound China and Korea in close suzerain–vassal rela-
tionship. And the Chinese failure to adhere to the way of the sages
was not unexpected because China was now under the yoke of the
Manchu rule and had allowed the Western barbarians to reside on
their shores and engage in trade.
This line of argument was reminiscent of the controversy that
divided the Korean court in the early seventeenth century when the
Manchus formally declared the establishment of the Ch‘ing dynasty
and thus challenged the reigning Ming dynasty. The Korean king
was then bound in suzerain–vassal relationship with the Ming dyn-
asty. In the face of military invasion by the Manchu hordes, the prag-
matists in the Yi court had argued for acceptance of the Manchu
demand for recognition of the new regime, and the concomitant
transference of their allegiance to the Manchu dynasty as unavoid-
able steps for the preservation of the Yi state. The idealists insisted
that Korea’s pledge of loyalty to the Ming dynasty was inviolable and
advocated a policy of resisting the Manchu barbarians even to the
death of the Korean state.83 Even though the pragmatists won the
day to pursue the policy of sadae towards the new Manchu dynasty,
the fierce Ming-loyalism lived on in the Korean mind long after the
Manchus had suppressed the Chinese Ming-loyalist movement in
southern China. Throughout the Ch‘ing period, the Koreans per-
ceived their relations with China on two levels: on the one hand,
82 Yi Hang-no’s memorial, 20 Oct. 1866, Sillok: Kojong, 3:62b. This sentiment
was echoed in the Taewo˘n‘gun’s own letter to government officials on 22 Oct. 1866:
‘[Anyone who] cannot bear the suffering and permits diplomatic relations are sel-
ling the country; [anyone who cannot bear] the poison and permits trade will be
letting the country perish . . .’ Quoted in Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai Nissen kankei no
kenkyu¯, reprint ed. (Tokyo: Munetaka shobo¯, 1972), 1:71.
83 Chang Ts‘un-wu, ‘Ch‘ing-Han kuan-hsi, 1636–1644’ [Ch‘ing–Korean rela-
tions, 1636–1644], in his Lun-wen chi, pp. 7–26.
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there was this idealized and moral China as represented by the Ming
dynasty to which Yi Korea had pledged absolute loyalty both moral
and political, and, at the other end of the spectrum, the real China
under the Manchu rule to which Korea was obliged to pledge loyalty
which was more political than moral.84 Korean diplomacy towards
China operated, as it were, in the chasm that separated the political
expediency of submission to real China, which represented the prac-
tical and businesslike approach to diplomacy, and the moral principle
of idealized China, which called for tough, ideologically correct
approach to diplomacy and rejected all practical expediencies. The
former approach prevailed in times of peace; but the latter had much
appeal to the conservative sector of the yangban class who advanced
it in times of crises as an alternative to the morally corrupt policy of
accommodation with barbarians.85
In this scheme of things, the Western barbarians who arrived on
Korea’s doorstep in the nineteenth century, did not represent in
Korean eyes a novel factor in their foreign policy considerations. They
were merely another variable in their familiar matrix of Sino-Korean
and barbarian–civilized world dichotomies. Thus, the Koreans man-
aged foreign incidents with considerable panache from 1801 to the
early 1860s, when their foreign policy operated on the pragmatic level.
The crisis situation in 1866, however, swung them away from their
usual pragmatism towards the advocacy of the idealized China (or the
Ming) which the Ch‘ing travestied. Such Korean intransigency rarely
occurred, but, when it did, Korean diplomacy assumed a quixotic
dimension and became less rational and less predictable.
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